ABSTRACT Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) will be integrated into the future Internet as one of the components of the Internet of Things, and will become globally addressable by any entity connected to the Internet. Despite the great potential of this integration, it also brings new threats, such as the exposure of sensor nodes to attacks originating from the Internet. In this context, lightweight authentication and key agreement protocols must be in place to enable end-to-end secure communication. Recently, Amin et al. proposed a three-factor mutual authentication protocol for WSNs. However, we identified several flaws in their protocol. We found that their protocol suffers from smart card loss attack where the user identity and password can be guessed using offline brute force techniques. Moreover, the protocol suffers from known session-specific temporary information attack, which leads to the disclosure of session keys in other sessions. Furthermore, the protocol is vulnerable to tracking attack and fails to fulfill user untraceability. To address these deficiencies, we present a lightweight and secure user authentication protocol based on the Rabin cryptosystem, which has the characteristic of computational asymmetry. We conduct a formal verification of our proposed protocol using ProVerif in order to demonstrate that our scheme fulfills the required security properties. We also present a comprehensive heuristic security analysis to show that our protocol is secure against all the possible attacks and provides the desired security features. The results we obtained show that our new protocol is a secure and lightweight solution for authentication and key agreement for Internetintegrated WSNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
One vision of future Internet is that objects and things with sensing and actuating capabilities will be connected and integrated making up the Internet of Things (IoTs). As Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is one of the core technologies supporting the sensing capabilities required by future applications, the integration of WSN with the Internet will have an active role in the evolution of the architecture of future Internet [1] - [3] . The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has developed a suite of protocols and open standards for integrating WSN into Internet [4] , such as 6LoWPAN [5] and ROLL [6] . As illustrated in Fig. 1 , sensor nodes (SNs) can be connected by low rate and low power wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.15.4, and can be further linked to the Internet via a 6LoWPAN gateway. Therefore, sensors will be globally addressable by any entity connected to the Internet thereby enabling the remote access of sensor data.
Despite its great potential, the integration of WSN with the Internet also brings new threats, such as the exposure of resource-constrained SNs and low rate wireless links in WSN to attacks emanating from the Internet [3] , [7] - [12] . Given its sensitivity and criticality, the sensor data in transit must be protected by an end-to-end (E2E) secure channel between the SN and the entity outside the WSN. The creation of such a channel requires authentication and key agreement mechanisms that allow two remote entities to mutually authenticate and negotiate secret keys that are used to protect the sensor data against various types of active and passive attacks [2] , [13] , [14] . Note that even if the WSN itself has security measures at a lower layer such as the link layer security services defined by IEEE 802.15.4, the openness of the Internet still requires authentication and key agreement protocols for establishing the E2E secure channel between the two communicating peers [2] .
It is not possible to directly utilize Internet-centric security solutions because of the inherent characteristics of WSN (e.g., the limited computational capabilities and power supply of sensors and mobile devices) [2] . As discussed in [15] , many attempts (for instance, IPsec [16] , IKEv2 [17] ) have been made to adapt standard Internet security protocols in this scenario.
However, resource limitation and the large number of SNs hinder the adoption of these solutions. Therefore, it is imperative to enable authentication and key establishment between the SN and the entity outside WSN in a secure and lightweight manner. However, past experiences [18] - [20] have shown that it is not trivial to design such security protocols.
A. RELATED WORKS
In the last decade, various security mechanisms [7] , [21] - [25] have been proposed to prevent unauthorized access to the sensor data in transit. Li and Xiong [24] proposed a signcryption scheme to protect the information flow between a sensor and an entity outside the WSN, which fulfills confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation in one step. However, bilinear pairing is used in the scheme, which makes it unsuitable (because of its high computation and processing overheads) for regular SNs.
Astorga et al. [25] proposed the Ladon security protocol which provides E2E authentication and key establishment mechanism for resource-constrained devices. To prevent potential eavesdroppers from tracking users' access patterns, they also presented a privacy-enhanced Ladon protocol by integrating the original protocol with the PrivaKERB user privacy framework for Kerberos [7] . In these protocols, the long keys need to be securely stored and may be compromised.
To improve WSN security, two-factor authentication (2FA) protocols [26] have been introduced in WSN. In such protocols, two different types of security credential are used, i.e., smart card and password, to prove his/her identity. Over a dozen of 2FA schemes for WSNs have been proposed in recent years [18] - [20] , [27] - [31] . We briefly review the ones closest to this work.
In 2014, Turkanovic et al. [32] proposed a lightweight 2FA protocol based on hash function for WSNs, which is claimed to be energy efficient and secure. However, Amin and Biswas [33] showed that the protocol of Turkanovic et al. [32] has several security weaknesses, including offline identity guessing attack, offline password guessing attack, impersonation attack, etc. To address these security deficiencies, they proposed a 2FA protocol for multigateway WSN. Independently, Farash et al. [34] also revealed that the protocol of Turkanovic et al. [32] is susceptible to smart card loss attacks (SCLA), impersonation attack, session key disclosure, et al. and proposed an improved 2FA protocol. In the same year, Chang and Le [35] demonstrated that the 2FA protocol by Turkanovic et al. [32] is prone to SN spoofing attack, stolen smart card attack, and stolen verifier attack, et al. Then they proposed two 2FA protocols P1 and P2 [37] . P1 is based on hash functions, while P2 employs Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
Lu et al. [36] analyzed Amin-Biswas's 2FA protocol [33] and identified several security drawbacks in their protocol. Next, they proposed an enhanced 2FA scheme using symmetric key cryptography, which is claimed to be resilient to a variety of attacks. Wu et al. [37] also pointed out that the 2FA protocol of Amin and Biswas [33] is insecure. Most recently, Das et al. [38] showed that both P1 and P2 by Chang and Le [35] are vulnerable to session specific temporary information attack and offline password guessing attack, etc. Amin et al. [39] found that the protocol of Farash et al. [34] cannot provide user anonymity, or withstand SCLA, offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack, known session-specific temporary information attack (KSSTIA).
To address the vulnerabilities associated with the various 2FA approaches and further enhance the security strength of 2FA protocols, three-factor authentication (3FA) protocols have attracted the attention of researchers [40] - [44] . In the context of WSN, Das [45] presented a 3FA protocol based on symmetric cryptographic primitives. Next, he also proposed two other 3FA protocols [46] - [47] . Unfortunately, Wu et al. [48] demonstrated that all the three protocols are not secure. To address the drawbacks, they proposed an improved 3FA scheme based on ECC. Independently, Li et al. [49] presented a novel 3FA protocol based on the concept of biohashing. However, Das et al. [50] demonstrated that the protocol of Li et al. [49] is vulnerable to privileged insider attack, SN capture attack and cannot provide user anonymity.
Most recently, to remedy these security loopholes in the protocol of Farash et al. [34] , Amin et al. [39] presented a new secure 3FA protocol, which is claimed to be secure against all the known security attacks. Additionally, to satisfy the practical requirements, their protocol provides the functionalities of post deployment, identity update, password update, and smart card revocation. However, we observe that the protocol by Amin et al. still has some subtle security weaknesses.
B. OUR RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
Although several 3FA protocols [38] , [39] , [45] - [49] have been proposed in the literature, all these protocols either fail to provide adequate security protection or suffer from various security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we use the most recent 3FA protocol of Amin et al. [39] as a case study to show the challenge of designing a lightweight authentication protocol suitable for Internet integrated WSN. Then we propose an authentication protocol for Internet integrated WSN which exploits the computational asymmetry feature of Rabin cryptosystem. We summarize our main research contributions as follows:
• First, we analyze the most recent 3FA protocol of Amin et al. [39] and we present its security drawbacks. Specifically, we found that their protocol suffers from Type I SCLA (the secret data obtained from the smart card is enough for an adversary to reveal the user password) and Type II SCLA (the transcripts of an authentication session are needed for an attacker, in addition to the secret parameters in the user's smart card). Specifically, the user identity and password can be exhaustively guessed in an offline manner along with the secrets stored in the stolen smart card and the intercepted authentication messages. Additionally, the protocol suffers from KSSTIA if the temporal parameters in an authentication session are disclosed. Furthermore, the protocol is prone to tracking attack and cannot fulfill user untraceability.
• Second, we present an efficient and secure 3FA protocol based on the Rabin cryptosystem. Unlike other public key-based encryption algorithms such as RSA and ECC, Rabin has the characteristic of computational asymmetry. In this case, the encryption is very efficient while the decryption is relatively heavyweight. This feature is particular well suited for Internet integrated WSN because the mobile device of users is generally resourceconstrained while the gateway has no such restriction.
• Third, we conducted a formal verification using ProVerif [51] to demonstrate that our protocol fulfills the required security features. Furthermore, we also present comprehensive heuristic security analysis to demonstrate that our protocol is capable of withstanding all the possible active and passive attacks including the security weaknesses revealed in the protocol of Amin et al., and we show how it provides the desired security features. Additionally, performance analysis shows that our proposed protocol is a practical solution that can provide authentication and key agreement for Internet integrated WSN, while achieving both security and efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The preliminaries of Biohashing and Rabin cryptosystem are given in Section 2. We review and analyze Amin et al.'s protocol [39] in Section 3 and 4 respectively. In Section 5, we propose a novel 3FA and key agreement protocol for Internet integrated WSN. Section 6 and Section 7 present security and efficiency analyses of the new protocol. Section 8 concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY A. BIOHASHING
Biometric is widely used to verify the identity of a user. It offers several advantages over traditional authentication methods, i.e., password and smart card. Biometric feature data is closely coupled with each individual and cannot be replaced. As a result, the disclosure of biometric data leads to serious privacy risks. Numerous schemes have been proposed to preserve the privacy of biometric template [52] - [55] .
Biohashing [55] , [56] is one of the mainstream privacypreserving biometric schemes. In the enrollment stage, a biohash value BH (K , B) is generated from the biometric template B and a random secret key K . Specifically, a preprocessing is performed on B in order to make the biometric feature invariant to small variations in the input biometric signal. Then, the biohash value BH (K , B) is generated by comparing the inner product of the random vector generated from the user specific secret key K and the feature vector extracted against a predefined threshold. In the verification stage, by following the process used at the enrolment stage, a biohash value BH (K , B ) can be generated from the received biometric signal B and the secret key given by the user. Afterwards, the verification is done by comparing BH (K , B ) with the stored value BH (K , B) [52] .
B. RABIN CRYPTOSYSTEM
The Rabin cryptosystem [57] , [58] is a public key cryptographic primitive based on integer factorization. The scheme includes three algorithms, i.e., key generation, encryption and decryption.
Key generation: We choose two large distinct primes p and q such that p, q ≡ 3(mod4), and compute N = pq. Then N is the public key, and (p, q) is the private key.
Encryption: We encrypt a plaintext m by computing c = m 2 mod N .
Decryption: We decrypt a ciphertext m = √ c mod N . Specifically, the receiver who knows the private key (p, q) can apply the Chinese remainder theorem to derive the four possible plaintexts {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 }. One common technique used to identify the correct plaintext is to add some predefined padding in the plaintext or requires the plaintext to conform to some pre-defined format.
If y has a square root x, i.e., there is a solution for y = x 2 mod N , then y is a quadratic residue mod N . The quadratic residue problem is described as follows: for y ∈ QR n , where QR n is the set of all quadratic residues mod N , it is computationally infeasible to find x without knowing p and q due to the hardness of factoring N .
III. REVIEW OF Amin et al.'s PROTOCOL
Amin et al.'s 3FA protocol [39] consists of 9 phases, i.e., system setup, SN registration, user registration, login, authentication, post deployment, identity update, password change, and smartcard revocation. We use the notations listed in Table 1 throughout this paper.
A. SYSTEM SETUP SA selects and computes the system parameters in offline mode.
Step 1: SA chooses a master secret key X GWN .
Step 2: SA selects an identity ID j and computes the secret key
Step 3: SA randomly generates a number R shrd , which is shared between GWN and S j . Finally, S j stores < ID j , X j , R shrd > in its memory.
B. SN REGISTRATION
When GWN and S j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) are deployed to form a WSN. Each S j executes the following procedure to register with GWN .
Step 1: S j computes S 1 = ID j ⊕ h(R shrd Ts 1 ) and S 2 = h(ID j X j R shrd Ts 1 ), and then sends < S 1 , S 2 , T s1 > to GWN .
Step 2: GWN verifies whether |T GWN − T s1 | ≤ T holds. If it is false, GWN rejects the request of S j ; otherwise, it computes ID j = S 1 ⊕ h(R shrd T s1 ), X = h(ID j X GWN ), and S 2 = h(ID j X j R shrd T s1 ) and checks whether S 2 = S 2 holds. If it is not true, GWN rejects S j ; otherwise, it accepts S j and stores ID j into the database. Then GWN sends a confirmation message to S j . Step 3: After receiving the confirmation message, S j deletes R shrd from its memory.
C. USER REGISTRATION
In this phase, U i executes the following procedure to register with SA.
Step 1: U i sends the selected identity ID i and personal credentials to SA through a secure channel.
Step 2: SA checks whether ID i exists in the database. If it does, SA indicates U i to select a new identity; otherwise, SA
SA maintains a database storing U i 's ID i and credentials.
Step 3: U i inserts the card into a card reader. U i then enters < ID i , PW i > and fingerprint fng i . The card
D. LOGIN
The following procedure is performed when U i wishes to access sensor data.
Step 
Step 3: U i selects the identity ID j of the sensor that he/she wishes to access, then the card computes
E. AUTHENTICATION
U i , GWN , and S j mutually authenticate each other and negotiate a secret key through the following steps.
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
and aborts the connection if M 5 = M 5 ; otherwise, it proceeds to execute the next procedure.
Step 4:
Step 5: S j checks whether |T 3 − T 2 | ≤ T holds, where T 3 is the current timestamp. If it is invalid, S j immediately terminates the session; otherwise, it computes
, and M 10 = K * * i ⊕ K j , where K j is a random number generated by S j . Finally, S j forwards
Step 6: GWN checks whether |T 4 −T 3 | ≤ T holds, where T 4 is the current timestamp. If it is invalid, GWN aborts the session; otherwise, it computes
Step 7:
otherwise, U i accepts that GWN and S j are authentic. The session key SK i = SK j = SK GWN are shared among U i , S j , and GWN .
F. POST DEPLOYMENT
In this phase, SNs can be deployed after the installation of a WSN. Assume that a new SN S k is required to be deployed in the target field. SA first chooses the identity ID k of S k , computes X k = h(ID k X GWN ), and writes < ID k , X k , R shrd > into the memory of S k . Then S k executes the SN registration phase to register with GWN .
G. IDENTITY UPDATE
In this phase, a registered user securely updates his/her identity as follows.
Step 1 of the login phase is performed to verify the legitimacy of U i . Then U i inputs a new identity ID new i , and then the smart card computes d
Step 2: GWN computes Step 3: 
and then checks whether
Z i = Z i holds. If it holds, GWN believes that U i is authentic. GWN then computes ID new i = DD i ⊕ h(L i d i T id ), d * * i = h(ID new i X GWN ), Y i = d * * i ⊕ d i , ZZ i = h(d * * i Z i ),The smart card calculates d * * i = Y i ⊕ d i and ZZ i = h(d * * i Z i ),B i ), f new i = dd * * i ⊕ h(ID new i PW i ), and g new i = L i ⊕ h(ID new i ⊕ PW i ). Finally, the card updates < e i , f i , g i > with < e new i , f new i , g new i >.
H. PASSWORD CHANGE
In this phase, U i updates the password PW i locally as follows.
Step 1: U i inserts his or her smart card into the card reader and executes Step 1 of the login phase to verify the validity of fingerprint, password, and identity.
IV. WEAKNESSES OF THE PROTOCOL BY Amin et al.
Before presenting the cryptanalysis of Amin et al.'s protocol, we first briefly present the adversarial model [59] - [61] .
1) The adversary A may capture all messages sent or received in the authentication session.
2) A can either (i) obtain the password of a registered user, or (ii) obtain a stolen or lost smart card of the user, and reveal the secret parameters in it by side channel attacks [62] , [63] , but not both at the same time.
3) A has the capability of enumerating offline all possible candidates in the Cartesian product D id * D pw in polynomial time, where D id and D pw denote the identity space and the password space respectively. 4) A may somehow learn the identity ID i of the victim when considering security properties (such as mutual authentication and session key security) and attacks (such as impersonation attack and SCLA).
In In a SCLA, A attempts to guess U i 's identity and password after extracting information from the smart card. It is worth noting that it is widely accepted when designing passwordbased protocols that the space of D pw is enumerable [64] . SCLAs can be classified into eight types [61] . In this paper, we focus on the attacks involving the extraction of secret information from a lost smart card, and classify them into two types, type I and II. In type I SCLA, the secret data obtained from U i 's card is enough for A to reveal U i 's password. In type II SCLA, the transcripts of an authentication session are needed for A, in addition to the secret parameters in U i 's smart card.
In [39] , the authors assumed that the probability of guessing ID i and PW i using e i is negligible. However, Wang et al. [59] pointed out that the identity of a user can be revealed by the attacker when the user's smart card is lost. Thus it is more prudent to take this risk into consideration.
Suppose that the smart card is somehow acquired by A, and then A reveals the parameters < B i , e i , f i , g i , SCN i , BK () > from the card. With the secret information e i = h(ID i PW i B i ) and B i , A may conduct an offline password guessing attack described below [61] .
Step The root cause of the above attack is that there is a definite password verifier (i.e., e i ) stored in U i 's card. As a result, it can be utilized by A to offline guess U i 's password.
B. TYPE II SCLA
Besides the assumption about the smart card in Type I SCLA, it is widely accepted that A can capture the messages (e.g.,
between U i and S in the process of authentication. Then, A can exhaustively guess U i 's password PW i as follows:
Step 1: A guesses a possible value ID * i of ID i and a value
, where g i is revealed from U i 's smart card, T 1 is captured from the open channel.
Step 3: A checks whether M * 1 ? = M 1 . If it is positive, A has found the correct pair of identity and password. Otherwise, A repeats the steps (1) to (3) until M * 1 = M 1 . The time complexity of the above attack is O(|D pw | * |D id | * 2T H ), and the time required for A to carry out this attack is linear to |D pw | * |D id |.
C. KNOWN-SESSION SPECIFIC TEMPORARY INFORMATION ATTACK
In the authentication phase, if U i is legitimate, GWN sends 
D. TRACKING ATTACK
When U i wishes to access sensor data, U i sends the message
Although ID i is concealed in M 1 , and each field in MSG 1 is dynamic, the identity of the smart card SCN i can be derived as SCN i = SCT i ⊕ h(T 1 ). Generally, the value of SCN i is fixed for a specific user, which is generated by SA in the registration phase, and updated only in the smart card revocation phase. With this fixed value, an adversary A can launch tracking attack as follows.
Suppose that a legal user U i interacts with
, then retrieves and stores SCN i . Then A can threaten the privacy of U i through two ways [29] . Firstly, if A obtains U i 's identity by accident, then he/she is capable of identifying the user at the instant that U i interacts with GWN by using the value SCN i . Moreover, even though A cannot obtain ID i , he/she is always capable of identifying different authentication sessions of U i via the value SCN i derived from each message
Then, he/she might collect various types of sensitive information related to U i , such as U i 's traveling routes, sensor access patterns, which may help A to violate user anonymity provided in Amin et al.'s protocol [39] . Therefore, Amin et al.'s protocol [39] is prone to tracking attack and cannot provide untraceability.
V. OUR PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
We enhance Amin et al.'s protocol as follows: (1) The public key primitive Rabin cryptosystem is employed to avoid SCLA and tracking attack. (2) The concept of fuzzy verifier [60] is adopted to achieve local password verification. (3) The timestamp mechanism mitigates session specific temporary information attack. Our new protocol also has 9 phases. SN registration and post deployment phase which remain unchanged are omitted here.
Step 1: SA first generates two large primes p and q, and computes N = pq, and keeps (p, q) as the private key. Then SA selects a master secret key X GWN and an integer 2 4 ≤ l ≤ 2 8 as the parameter of fuzzy verifier.
Step 2: SA selects an identity ID j and computes the secret key X j = h(ID j X GWN ) for S j (1 ≤ j ≤ m).
B. USER REGISTRATION
In this phase, U i executes the following procedure to register with SA as shown in Fig. 2 .
Step 2: SA checks whether ID i exists in the database. If it does, SA indicates U i to select a new identity; otherwise, SA generates a random number
Step 3: U i attaches the card into a card reader. Then he/she enters < ID i , PW i > and imprints fng i . The card selects a random number r i , computes
C. LOGIN
The following procedure is performed when U i wishes to access sensor data as shown in Fig. 3 .
Step 3: U i selects the identity ID j of the sensor that he/she wishes to access, then the card computes EID j = ID j ⊕ h(ID i K i T 1 )and sends MSG 1 
D. AUTHENTICATION
To achieve mutual authentication and session key agreement among U i , GWN , and S j , the following steps are executed as shown in Fig. 3 .
Step 1: After receiving MSG 1 from U i , GWN decrypts M 1 using p and q to obtain ID i , SCN i , K i , and then retrieves x i according to ID , and verifies whether SCN i matches the value in the entry. If the two values do not match, then GWN rejects the request and aborts; otherwise, GWN com-
Step 2: S j checks whether |T 3 − T 2 | ≤ T holds, where T 3 is the current timestamp. If it is invalid, S j immediately terminates the session; otherwise, it computes ID 
Step 3: GWN checks whether |T 4 −T 3 | ≤ T holds, where T 4 is the current timestamp. If it is negative, GWN aborts the session; otherwise it computes
otherwise, U i accepts that GWN and S j are authentic. At this point, a session key SK i = SK j = SK GWN has been established among U i , S j , and GWN .
E. IDENTITY UPDATE
In this phase, a registered user securely updates the identity as follows.
Step 2: GWN decrypts DD i using p and q to obtain ID i , SCN i , ID new i , then retrieves x i according to ID i , and verifies whether SCN i matches the value in the entry. If the two values do not match, then GWN terminates; otherwise, GWN
T id ). Then GWN sends < ZZ i , Y i > to the card and updates ID new i in the database.
Step 3: 
F. PASSWORD CHANGE
In this phase, an authorized user U i updates the password PW i locally.
Step 1: U i inserts his/her smart card into a card reader and carries out Step 1 of the login phase to verify the validity of fingerprint, password, and identity.
Step 2 
h(ID i PW
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first conduct a formal verification using ProVerif to demonstrate that our protocol fulfills the required security properties. Furthermore, we also present comprehensive heuristic security analysis and comparison.
A. FORMAL VERIFICATION WITH ProVerif
ProVerif [51] is a widely used formal verification tool for automatic security analysis of security protocols, which is used to prove the secrecy and authentication properties of our proposed protocol.
First we define the channels and types. c1 is the public channel between the user device and GWN and c2 is the public channel between GWN and the sensor. ==> inj-event(serverGen(sensor)). query inj-event(serverGen(sensor))
==> inj-event(sensorGen(user, server)). IDj) ) ) The outcome of executing the processes in ProVerif version 1.96 is given below. The results demonstrate that our protocol achieves session key secrecy and mutual authentication.
RESULT 
B. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
We first show that our 3FA protocol could overcome weaknesses in Amin et al.'s authentication protocol, and then we show that our protocol achieves all the desired security features.
1) RESISTING TYPE I SCLA
Type I SCLA is infeasible in our protocol. We explain why below.
Assume that the opponent A extracts the smart card information [59] , [60] .
Therefore, our protocol is secure against type I SCLA.
2) RESISTING TYPE II SCLA
Moreover, type II SCLA is also infeasible in our protocol. Suppose A could also intercept the message
, where g i is revealed from U i 's smart card. Due to the hardness of quadratic residue problem, it is impossible for the adversary to compute R 1 from the value
, which is a necessary to check the correctness of ID * i and PW * i . Thus, our 3FA protocol is completely secure against type II SCLA.
3) RESISTING KSSTIA
In Amin et al.'s protocol, the static value h(ID i X j ) is used to protect the ephemeral random numbers, where X j is the sensor key shared between S j and GW . As a result, the disclosure of ephemeral random number K i will lead to the compromise of the static value h(ID i X j ), which in turn will cause the compromise of ephemeral random numbers in other authentication sessions. In our proposed protocol, we avoid this risk by introducing the mechanisms of timestamp and hash. Specifically, we compute M 5 = K i ⊕h(ID i ID j X j T 2 ). In this case, even though K i is compromised, the opponent can only obtain the hashed value h(ID i ID j X j T 2 ), which is dynamic in each authentication session and will not endanger the ephemeral random number in other authentication sessions. Thus our 3FA protocol is immune from KSSTIA.
4) RESISTING USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
The opponent A cannot carry out user impersonation attack against our protocol. Assume that A has the user U i 's smart card and has extracted the data < e i , f i , g i , SCN i , l, n, r i , BH (·, ·), h() > stored in it. We also assume that A has intercepted the messages exchanged in the previous authentication sessions. In our protocol, A has to possess all the authentication factors, i.e., PW i , the smart card, and the biometric, to produce a legal message MSG 1 =< M 1 , M 2 , T 1 , EID j >. Specifically, the key to proving the legitimacy of U i is the value
. The critical fields of the computation of M 2 are the values 2 mod n, which is computationally infeasible because of the hardness of quadratic residue problem. Thus, the protocol can withstand the gateway node impersonation attack.
6) RESISTING SN IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Suppose A tries to impersonate S j after capturing the messages exchanged in the previous authentication sessions. A needs to generate MSG 3 
. Similar to the analysis of gateway impersonation attack, A is unable to obtain K i . Thus A cannot carry out the SN impersonation attack.
7) RESISTING MODIFICATION ATTACK
In our protocol, the opponent A is unable to modify any of the messages
Assume that A intercepts one of these messages, and then transmits a modified one. However, each message is protected by a hash value computed with a secret value. For instance, in MSG 1 , A cannot calculate
are secret values which cannot be computed without knowing either PW i , the smart card, or the biometric. Any modification will be detected by the receiver of the message who will check the correctness of the hash value in each message. Hence, our protocol is secure against modification attacks.
8) RESISTING REPLAY ATTACK
In our protocol, A may attempt to replay old messages sent by the entities. However, the timestamp mechanism and the challenge-response mechanism are used in all the messages involved to resist replay attacks. Specifically,
> are protected by a hash value which is computed with a shared secret between the sender and receiver. As a result, A cannot bypass the timestamp. If A would replay a previous message, it will be detected by the receiver instantly through checking the timestamp and the hash value.
On the other hand, MSG 4 =< M 7 , M 8 > contains a challenge K i , which is chosen by U i . Additionally, these two messages are also protected by a hash value computed with K i . Thus, A cannot bypass the challenge-response mechanism. Then GW and U i could discover message replay by validating the freshness of K i .
Thus, our 3FA protocol could defend against replay attacks.
9) RESISTING PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
In practice, users may register across different information systems with the same password. If a privileged insider may somehow obtain the password of the user, he/she can use it to impersonate as this user to access the services of other systems. In our protocol, U i only submits ID i during the registration phase. As a result, an insider cannot obtain U i 's password. Hence, our protocol can withstand privileged insider attack.
10) RESISTING STOLEN VERIFIER ATTACK
In this attack, an opponent steals the verification information (e.g., plaintext or hashed passwords) stored in the server. In our protocol, the server maintains a database storing < ID i , SCN i , x i , Personal credential >, which has no information related to the password. Thus, stolen verifier attack is not possible in our protocol.
11) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
An adversary cannot generate legal 
12) SESSION KEY AGREEMENT
In a successful authentication session, the session key SK = h(ID i ID j K i K j ) is established between U i and S j to protect future communication. It is worth pointing out that the secrecy of SK is dependent on the secrecy of the random numbers involved. All these values are carefully protected by the secret values shared between the participants in each message.
Suppose the session key SK = h(ID i ID j K i K j ) of one session is disclosed to the opponent A. However, he/she cannot compute any of the past and future session keys by using SK because the session key is protected by h() and the random numbers < K i , K j > are different in each session. As a result, our 3FA protocol achieves session key agreement and known key security.
13) USER ANONYMITY
Privacy is of increasing importance in the IoT and cloud computing era [65] - [70] . Suppose the opponent A first captures all the messages transmitted between the participants during the protocol execution and then tries to guess the identity of the user. In our proposed protocol, U i 's identity ID i is included in the field M 1 = (ID i SCN i K i ) 2 mod n in the first message. To get ID i , A has to know the secret key (p, q) of GWN . It is impossible to do so because the secret key is carefully protected by the administrator. The other way left for A to obtain ID i is to decrypt the value M 1 = (ID i SCN i K i ) 2 mod n, which is computationally infeasible due to the hardness of quadratic residue problem. Hence, our 3FA protocol achieves user anonymity.
14) USER UNTRACEABILITY
To track a user, A captures these messages involved in different authentication sessions and checks whether they have the same field to learn whether the same user are involved. However, A cannot trace U i by capturing the authentication messages. Assume that A intercepts
We note that the computation of each field involves the timestamp and a random number which are different in each session. As a result, the messages of each session are also different. Therefore, our protocol resists user tracking attacks and achieves user untraceability.
15) BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PRIVACY
Biometric template privacy is preserved in our protocol. First, the user provides no biometric templates to the server, and the server stores no information related to the user's biometric template. Second, the biometric information is first converted by the biohashing algorithm and then protected by the hash function. Since these two mechanisms are both one-way operation, the information stored in the smart card will not leak biometrics. Therefore, biometric template privacy is achieved in our protocol.
16) SMART CARD AND USER REVOCATION
In our scheme, a database storing the user identity and smart card number is maintained, through which the invalid smart card will be detected. Thus, lost/stolen smart card can be revoked by removing the card number from the database.
C. COMPARISON OF SECURITY FEATURES
In Table 2 , we present the comparison of our 3FA protocol with the ones in [39] and [48] .
From Table 2 Table 2 shows that our new protocol is the only one that is free from security attacks and provides the required features.
VII. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
We evaluate the efficiency of our new protocol and compare it with other protocols. Since SNs are constrained in terms of critical resources such as memory, processing power and energy, special attention must be given to the computation cost of security protocols for WSN [71] .
In Table 3 , we summarize the computational time of our new protocol and the related ones in [38] , [39] , [45] , [48] , and [49] . We focus only on the login and authentication phase and ignore the bit XOR operation because it requires very low computation. T H , T S , T M , T QR , T ECM denote the cost for executing the hash, the symmetric encryption/decryption, the modular squaring, the computation of a square root modulo N , and ECC point multiplication respectively. It is worth noting that the modular squaring is as efficient as the hash operation while the computation of a square root modulo N is similar to modular exponentiation. Table 3 shows the results of the comparison. Our protocol is as efficient as the most efficient one of these previously proposed protocols at the mobile device and SNs. Although the computation cost for the gateway of our proposed scheme is higher than that of Amin et al.'s protocol and Das's protocol, generally it is not a concern, because the gateway is powerful and has no resource constraints. Moreover, Das's protocol and Amin et al.'s protocol [39] is prone to SCLA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the three-factor mutual authentication protocol of Amin et al. and we have shown its security drawbacks. The protocol of Amin et al. suffers from Type I SCLA and Type II SCLA. In particular, the user identity and password can be exhaustively guessed in an offline manner with the secrets stored in the stolen smart card and the intercepted authentication messages. Furthermore, the protocol suffers from KSSTIA when the temporal parameters in an authentication session are disclosed. Finally, the protocol is prone to tracking attack and fails to fulfill user untraceability.
Next, we have presented a lightweight and secure threefactor authentication protocol based on Rabin cryptosystem. We conducted a formal verification of the proposed protocol by using ProVerif to demonstrate that it fulfills the required security features. Furthermore, we also present a comprehensive heuristic security analysis to demonstrate that our protocol is capable of withstanding all the possible active and passive attacks including addressing the weaknesses revealed in the protocol of Amin et al., and we further show that our proposed protocol support all the desired security features. A performance analysis of our proposed protocol shows that it can be deployed in practice for Internet-integrated WSN, while achieving a balance between security and efficiency. 
